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MUNICIPAL INDUCEMENTS TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY
-INTRODUCTION
In recent years many state and local governments have inaugu-
rated extensive programs aimed at attracting private industry to
their areas.' The primary reason for this encouragement is the be-
lief that the establishment of private industry in most communities
will result in increased prosperity and a higher standard of living
through the creation of more jobs, greater spending power, and
higher income.2 In carrying out these programs, the three most
frequently used methods of municipal or state inducement have been
(1) advertising of the area's advantages, (2) municipal financial
aid, such as the construction of plants to be leased to industry, and
(3) the granting of special tax concessions.3 Although the legality
of the inducements used by municipalities has frequently been ques-
tioned,4 the legal problems seem to remain obscure. The emphasis in
this Note will therefore be placed on the legal restrictions upon
municipal inducements; however, the social and economic implica-
tions will not be ignored.
ADVERTISING AS A PUBLIC PURPOSE
Nearly one-half of the states and many municipalities now ap-
propriate public funds for the purpose of advertising the general
business conditions peculiar to their area.' The areals accessibility
to markets, raw materials, service facilities, and labor supply are
apt to be among the conditions mentioned in the brochures, folders,
and magazine advertisements that are circulated throughout the
country." There exists an expectation that the information in these
publications will exert an influence on the industrial leaders who are
considering the ramifications of relocation.
The legality of this municipal advertising expenditure rests
upon a finding, first, that the expenditure has been authorized by
the legislature since a municipality can exercise only those powers
expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by the legislature, and,
second, that the expenditure is for a valid "public purpose."7 The
"public purpose" restriction is either expressly provided for in the
state constitutions, or is inherent in the nature of government since
1. See Durisch, Attracting Indtatry to Cities, 42 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 224
(1953).
2. See Floyd, Effects of Taxation on Industrial Location 3 (1952).
3. See 9 Duke B. A. J. 15, 16 (1941).
4. E.g., Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 24 U. S. L. Week 2265(N.M. Dec. 20, 1955) ; City of Fernandina v. State, 197 So. 454 (Fla. 1940).
5. See 9 Duke B. A. J. 15, 16-17 (1941).
6. See, e.g., Fortune, June, 1954, pp. 77-78.
7. See 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 15.26 (1955).
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it is said that the activities of a government and its subdivisions
must be confined to the business of the government for which pur-
pose these bodies were created." Taxing or spending of public funds
for a private purpose has long been held invalid as a taking of
property without due process of law,9 but the problem still remains
as to what constitutes a "public purpose."
Although the concept of "public purpose" is not susceptible of
one definition, the courts generally construe it to mean an expendi-
ture which serves as a benefit to the inhabitants of the community
as a body and which is, at the same time, directly related to the
functions of the local government.1 0 This broad general definition is
helpful only as a guide for the court in deciding by the facts of each
case what constitutes a public purpose. Such expenditures as those
for the development of public parks, construction of airports, pay-
ment of bus fare for school children, and establishment of housing
projects have been held to be for a public purpose, while, on the
other hand, expenditures for construction of an opera house, opera-
tion of child care centers, tourist camps, and golf courses have been
held not to be for a public purpose.", Since it is virtually impossible
to draw from such decisions a meaningful principle which would
serve as a useful guide, it is clear that the problem of public pur-
pose must be particularized and dealt with on a very concrete level.
In the past, advertising was not always considered to be for a
public purpose, but now the great majority of the courts in the
United States hold that an expenditure of public funds for adver-
tising the advantages of a municipality to attract industry is for a
public purpose when authorized by the legislature.1 2 These decisions
decisions are based on the theory that advertising of this type is a
promotion of the trade and commerce of the community. 18
One study has revealed that much of this advertising has been of
dubious effect, 14 but, if there is a benefit, it is one that, unlike direct
financial supports to an industry, does not aid primarily one private
organization but rather inures to the entire community. Conse-
quently, the expenditure does not appear to be an unwarranted
public appropriation insofar as the public purpose doctrine is con-
cerned.
8. See 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 12.11 (1955).
9. 1 Cooley, Taxation § 174 (4th ed. 1924).
10. See 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 44.35 (3d ed. 1950).
11. See 15 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 39.21 (3d ed. 1950).
12. See 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 15.29 (1955).
13. See Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, 212 Cal. 607,
612, 299 Pac. 728, 730 (1931).
14. See 67 American City, April, 1952, p. 117.
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The problem should diminish in magnitude with the recent
entrance of private enterprises into the field of such advertising.
Banks, power companies and railroad companies, among other
private interests, have set aside sums of money for advertising the
area's wares, sometimes in cooperation with government units."9
These companies seem to derive substantial gains from the growth
and expansion of the community because of their advantageous
position in the area's economic structure. Thus they will probably
continue to advertise so long as they believe it leads to area growth.
RESTRICTIONS ON MUNICIPAL FINANCING OF PLANTS FOR
PRIVATE INDUSTRY
Another inducement frequently used by municipalities is that
of financing the construction of plants, which are then leased to
private industry. 6 Since 1936,'when Mississippi enacted a statute
authorizing this practice,17 six states have followed with similar
legislation devised to reduce unemployment and balance agriculture
with industry.' s The major difference in these laws is that Missi-
sippi and Louisiana legislation authorize the issuance of "general
obligation" bonds payable from the taxes and general funds of the
municipality, while statutes in the other five states allow only the
issue of self liquidating revenue bonds which are payable solely
from the rental income of the project financed.1 Thus, the munici-
pality in the latter states can in no way incur an obligation to pay
the debt from its general funds upon default of rental payments
by the lessee. The Mississippi statute also creates an industrial com-
mission to effectuate the purposes specified. -0 That commission is
empowered to determine whether the public convenience and neces-
sity require a plant in an area and whether the municipality may
sell, lease or operate the plant.2 Some municipalities have issued
revenue bonds for this purpose without express statutory author-
ization.22
15. Discussion with Mr. Eugene A. Kraut, Assistant Industrial Director,
Saint Paul Chamber of Commerce.
16. See 9 Duke B. A. J. 15, 17 (1941).
17. Miss. Laws 1st Extraordinary Sess. 1936, c. 1 § 7. The statute %as
re-enacted into its present form in 1944. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 8936.07, .09, .20
(Supp. 1954).
18. La. Acts 1954, Const. Amend. 1952, p. 145, L. S. A. Coast. art. 14
§ 14b.2; N. M. Laws 1955, c. 234 § 3; IlL Rev. Stat. c. 24 § 1214 (1955) ;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4406.53(d) (Williams Supp. 1952) ; Ala. Acts 1951, No.
756 § 3, p. 1307; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 103.210 (Baldwin 1955).
19. La. Acts 1954, Coast. Amend. 1952, p. 145, L. S. A. Const. art. 14§ 14b.2; N. M. Laws 1955, c. 234 § 4; Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 24 § 1220 (1955) ;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 5406.53n (Williams Supp. 1952) ; Ala. Acts 1951 No. 756§ 4, p. 1307; Ky. Rev. Stat Ann. § 103.230 (Baldwin 1955).
20. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 8936, 8936.01 (Supp. 1954).
21. Miss. Code Ann. 8§ 8936.07, .09 (Supp. 1954).
22. See; e.g., State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
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Under the most common method, the municipality issues tax-
exempt self-liquidating revenue bonds, proceeds of which are to be
used for the acquisition of a new plant. These plants are later
leased to the companies for an extensive period at an annual rental
charge that will ultimately discharge the bond debt at its maturity.23
Further rental charges by the municipality are customarily nomi-
nal ;24 therefore, the cumulative rental payments over a long period
will not greatly exceed the purchase price of the plant.
Of all the inducements, plant financing seemingly provides the
most beneficial aid to an industry, since it allows the enterprise to
retain its working capital unimpaired and available for business
rather than to tie up a large sum of money in the investment of the
building itself.25 In addition, the company is generally not burdened
with the usual ad valorem property taxes incidental to doing busi-
ness,28 as the city owns the building even though it is usually built to
company specifications.2 7 The concern is also allowed to deduct the
annual rental payments from net income for purposes of computing
income taxes.28 It is interesting to note, however, that the latter
privilege was jeopardized recently by a bill proposed in Congress
which attempted to disallow this deduction on the grounds that
benefits of the federal tax exemption of municipal bonds were being
diverted to private industries.20 The provision was not adopted and
industrial development revenue bonds have specifically been de-
dared tax-exempt,30 but the committee report seems to indicate
a growing dissatisfaction with the misuse of the bond exemption
and the result may be similar legislation in the future.8
Municipal financing of industrial development has encountered
several legal obstacles which have threatened its validity and the
constitutionality of stautes which authorize it.12 One successful pro-
hibition has been a provision in many state constitutions which
forbids a state or its subdivisions from donating to or lending its
credit to or in aid of any private enterprise. 33 This provision was
23. See Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 24 U. S. L. Week 2265
(N.M. Dec. 20, 1955).
24. See Clark, The Municipal Bond Market, 67 American City, March,
1952, pp. 114, 115.
25. Ibid.
26. Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 63-4, 57 So. 2d 629, 641
(1952) (dissenting opinion).
27. See C. Clark, supra note 24 at 115.
28. Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 64, 57 So. 2d 629, 641
'(1952) (dissenting opinion).
29. See Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 180 (1955 ed.).
30. Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 Cure. Bull. 28.
31. See Surry and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 180 (1955 ed.).
32. See 47 Yale L. J. 1412 (1938).
33. See 1 Jones, Bonds and Bond Securities § 148 (4th ed. 1935).
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originally enacted to preserve the financial stability of the munici-
pality following a period when municipalities had speculated in the
investment of stock of railroad companies with proceeds obtained
by municipal bond issues.3 4 The practice was carried to such an
extent that discharge of the debts became impossible, resulting in
an impoverishment of the municipality and a pecuniary loss to the
taxpayer
3 5
The most significant application of this constitutional prohibition
in found in a recent New Mexico case where a declaratory judg-
ment action was brought to test the constitutionality of a state
statute authorizing the municipal financing of industrial buildings
through the-proceeds of municipal revenue bonds.5 The court ruled
that the state statute was unconstitutional since the object of the
legislature was dearly contrary to the constitutional provision for-
bidding a municipality from lending credit in aid of-private enter-
prise.3 7
Although such a constitutional provision has been the legal basis
for invalidating a similar plan by a Florida municipality acting
without statutory authority,"8 and, in the past, has even invalidated
a state statute which authorized municipal plans of this type
financed by the issue of general obligation bonds,3 the significance
of the New Mexico decision lies in the fact that this is the first
statute struck down which authorized the issuance of revenue bonds
payable only from plant income.40 Since 1936 when the recent surge
of state legislation began, three of the four other statutes requiring
revenue bond financing have survived the test, the court holding
in each case that the activity was not a lending of credit in aid of a
private industry.41 In these cases the courts stressed the point that
the municipality could incure no liability on the revenue bonds other
than an obligation to pay the amount of the rental payments received
from the lessee industry. 2 The fourth statute has remained unchal-
lenged. The Mississippi statute, allowing general obligation financ-
ing, satisfactorily met the challenge in 1938 when the court dis-
34. See 1 Jones, op. cit. supra note 33, § 148.
35. Ibid. ,
36. Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 24 U. S. L. Week 2265 (N.M.
Dec. 20, 1955).
37. Ibid.
38. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
39. Carothers v. Town of Booneville, 169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934).
40. Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 24 U. S. L. Week 2265 (N.M.
Dec. 20, 1955).
41. Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952);
Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951) ; Faul-
coner v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S. W. 2d 80 (1950).
42. Ibid.
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tinguished the statute from a similar Mississippi statute declared
unconstitutional four years previously as a municipal lending of
credit.43 The court reasoned that the municipality in this plan, un-
like the one in the previous plan, retained power through its com-
mission to ensure the use of the property for the purposes intended
to be accomplished by the law.44 The soundness of the distinction
has been questioned.43 The Louisiana provision permitting the issue
of general obligation bonds, although challenged, was not attacked
as an unconstitutional lending of credit, since it is itself a consti-
tutional amendment.
40
The soundness of the legal support behind the New Mexico
decision is at least doubtful in view of the fact that the purpose of
this constitutional provision was to protect the fiscal structure
of the municipality. No danger arises under the New Mexico statute
where revenue bonds are the mode of financing since the general
credit on taxing power of the municipality is not pledged.
The use of revenue bonds, however, has been condmned by some
financial experts as an undesirable method of financing and a rather
risky investment.4 7 Although these obligations are represented as
municipal bonds, some critics claim that the bonds are not true
municipal obligations, since they are not secured by the taxing power
of the municipality.4" Rather, the sole backing is the revenue from
the project financed.49 Actually these revenue bonds more closely
resemble the obligations of a corporation."0 Since the average in-
vestor is not aware of these facts, default of payment by the industry
might weaken the municipal name and credit.51
Another impediment to the successful operation of a municipal
industrial development program is the "public purpose" doctrine
which prohibits spending public funds or taxing for a private pur-
pose.5 2 For many years the doctrine has been invoked to invalidate
statutes authorizing municipalities to finance the erection of plants
through the proceeds of general obligation bonds.5 3 It has in the past
43. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal
dismissed, 303 U. S. 627 (1938).
44. Id. at 105-106, 178 So. at 807.
45. See Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 898, 903 (1953) ; 12 Tul. L. Rev. 645, 647
(1938).
46. Miller v. Police Jury of Washington Parish, 226 La. 7, 74 So. 2d
394 (1954).
47. See Garwood, Are Municipal Subsidies for Industrial Location
Sound? 68 American City, May, 1953, pp. 110, 111.
48. See Business Week, Sept. 1, 1951, p. 102.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. See Garwood, supra note 47 at 111.
52. See 47 Yale L. J. 1412 (1938).
53. E.g., Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875).
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been held that the encouragement or promotion of a private indus-
trial enterprise is not a public purpose for which taxes may be
imposed or public funds appropriated."' the strongly advocated
position that the addition of a new industry in many communities is
for a-public purpose because it alleviates unemployment and "its
twin offspring, hunger and crime" has been rejected.53 Instead, the
reasoning has been advanced that the primary benefits are received
by a private industry which is in no way controlled by the munici-
pality while the community only obtains incidental gains from the
expenditure.58 Furthermore, courts have claimed that the addition
to a community of any business which employs capital and labor
benefits the area to some extent, but the appropriation of public
funds to each additional builder, innkeeper, or merchant in the area,
for example, would not be an appropriate public expenditure al-
though these enterprises would seem to be equally deserving of the
aid.57
Yet, a strong argument can be made for the proposition that this
type of program is for a public purpose, especially when used in the
deep South. A glance at the statistics will reveal the amazing recent
increase in per capita income in the South.58 and it is not unreasonable
to suppose that this is due to the migration of industries to that area.
Since the South has always been% plagued with poverty and unem-
ployment, it is difficult to perceive of a more beneficial aid to a
community than relief from these deplorable conditions. Thus, as a
purpose, inducement to industry should qualify as "public" within
the meaning of the state constitution.
The Mississippi statute which authorizes the issue of general obli-
gation bonds has been successful in escaping the destructive force of
the public purpose doctrine.59 When the statute was challenged on
these grounds, the Mississippi court acknowledged the fact that
similar projects have been held not to be for a public purpose, but
54. E.g., Azbill v. Lexington Mfg. Co., 188 Tenn. 477, 487, 221 S. V. 2d
522, 524 (1949).
55. Ibid.
56. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 93-4, 275 S. IV. 29, 30 (1925).
57. Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U. S. (20 WalL) 655. 665 (1875)
(dictum) ; State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779, 784-85 (Fla. 1952)(dictum).
58. See McLaughlin and Robock, Why Industry Moves South 12 (1949).
The chart indicates the percenthge increases m per capita income in south-
ern states from 1940 to 1947. The percentage increases ranged from 136%
in Virginia to 226% in Mississippi as compared to a 130% increase in the
continental United States.
59. Miller v. Police Jury of Washington Parish, 226 La. 7, 74 So.
2d 394 (1954); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 109, 178 So. 799,
809, appeal dismissed, 303 U. S. 627 (1938).
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distinguished the challenged statute on the basis that the legislature
in enacting the statute specified a public policy predicated on the
abnormal social and economic conditions of the time which justified
the enactment of the statute."0 The Louisiana constitutional amend-
ment was passed at a time when a group of dairy farmers, compris-
ing the major portion of the area's inhabitants, were unable to sell
their milk because it could not be processed, so the municipality, act-
ing under the amendment, purchased and leased a plant to a milk
processer. Because the provision is a constitutional amendment, it
could only be attacked effectively on a federal ground, and there
does not seem to be such a federal ground since the United States
Supreme Court had dismissed for lack of a substantial federal ques-
tion the appeal from a decision on a similar Mississippi statute.01 In
upholding the plan and the amendment, the court reasoned that the
primary purpose was to relieve the area of a serious economic con-
dition and that the leasing of the property was only incidental to the
desired results.52 The reasoning in both the Mississippi and Louisi-
ana decisions appears to be contrary to the prevailing law and does
not seem to provide satisfactory criteria'for distinguishing the cases
from prior law. The mere inclusion in a statute of its express pur-
pose should not be a decisive factor in distinguishing the Mississippi
case nor should the arbitrary distinction between prmary and inci-
dental purposes be adequate in the Louisiana case.03 Actually, these
courts appear to be establishing that municipal financing of plants
now qualifies as within the definition of public purposes. In effect,
this is a modification of the law but is made to look as if there
were no change.
Through the authorization of the financing of this program by
self-liquidating revenue bonds, other industrial development statutes
have been able to avoid running afoul of the public purpose doctrine,
since that method does not involve the pledging of the general credit
or taxing power.64
The most recent innovation in the field of business development
has been the formulation of industrial development foundations.03
These organization are corporation set up by private citizens to pro-
vide financial services to industries in an effort to create an incentive
60. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 109, 178 So. 799, 809,
appeal dismissed, 303 U. S. 627 (1938).
61. Ibid.
62. See Miller v. Police Jury of Washington Parish, 226 La. 7, 19, 74
So. 2d 394, 398 (1954).
63. For similar reasoning see Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 898, 903 (1953).
64. See note 41, supra.
65. See Business Week, April 9, 1949, p. 30.
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for relocation or expansion in their area.6 0 Funds, obtained by
subscriptions of stock and donations, 7 are used primarily for three
main purposes: (1) buying, developing, and selling industrial
sites, (2) buying, building, leasing, and selling plants and (3) loans
to new industries and sometimes even to establish industries for
expansion purposes."" In an extremely rare case one industrial com-
mission has gone so far as to offer $10,000 cash to any industry
which would locate at their city and employ more than 100 people.05
Usually, however, these commissions do not even advocate selling
or leasing plants or sites below their costs.
In 1943 Albert Lea, Minnesota, was selected by the United
States Chamber of Commerce as an area to experiment with these
foundations.7 0 Since that area's "Jobs Incorporated" was so success-
ful in attracting industry, the United States Chamber of Com-
merce used the Albert Lea System as an example of a way to en-
courage the location of industry.7' In recent years, many of
these foundations, a great part of them non-profit,72 have sprung
up throughout the country and have been regarded as successful. "
This step seems to be a most effective stride in the right direction
by communities who pursue a satisfactory industrial development
program. The device is equally available to groups of individuals
in all areas of the United States; furthermore, the method appears
to be a desirable means of achieving the goal since it avoids the abuse
of bond tax-exemption. Municipal bonds are not used and the funds
of the public and the taxpayer are not involved, so there is no danger
of injury to~the taxpayer or municipality ;74 consequently, this prac-
tice will probable not be barred by legal sanction.
SUBSIDIES IN THE FORM OF TAX EXEMPTION
As an incentive to location in their areas, many state and local
governments have offered exemption of municipal taxes to private
industries.7 5 The granting of these indirect subsidies is not a recent
66. Id. at 32.
67. Id. at 31.
68. See 65 American City, Nov., 1950, p. 87.
69. See Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1956, p. 9, cols. 1-2 (advertise-
ment).
70. See Transmission, Spring Edition, 1953, p. 16. The magazine is
published quarterly by the Northern Natural Gas Company.
71. Correspondence with Mr. William H. Sykes, Executive Secretary of
Albert Lea's "Jobs Incorporated" indicates that the United States Chamber
of Commerce used the Albert Lea plan as an example in 1953.
72. See Business Week, April 9, 1949, pp. 30, 36.
73. See 65 American City, Nov., 1950, p. 87.
74. See Clark, The Municipal Bond Market, 67 American City, March,
1952, pp. 114, 115.
75. See 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 44.75 (3d ed. 1950).
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development in the United States but has been practiced since the
early colonial days.76 Tax concessions have grown in importance
since the last depression when extensive legislation of that type was
adopted77 until, by 1949, tax concessions to industry were offered in
seventeen states,78 primarily in the regions of New England and
the South.79
Among the various types of exemptions, the most common is
that of exempting industries from local property taxes on plants and
equipment for a limited period, usually five to fifteen years.8 0 The
obvious advantage to industry lies in the relief of a regular business
expense."'
Since the legislature has the power to classify the property that
shall be taxed, it, rather than the local government, has the power
to determine the property which will be exempt from taxation. 2 The
power, however, may be delegated to a municipality.83 The legisla-
tive power to exempt may be limited by certain state constitutional
provisions.84 The exemption can not be an arbitrary one that results
in no benefit to the public, but must be for a "public purpose."8'I
Oddly enough, a direct subsidy to private industry would be invalid
or not for a "public purpose," but an indirect subsidy in the form of
a tax exemption has generally been upheld. 0 The public purpose re-
quirement is not as strictly construed when applied to tax exemptions
which involve no direct appropriation of funds as it is when a direct
expenditure is involved.87 Although the courts uphold exemptions
under the "public purpose" doctrine, a tax exemption, nevertheless,
would seem to be an absolute gift to the industry. Since the industry
is discharged from the annual obligation of paying a debt while,
concurrently, the municipal treasury is deprived of a source of
revenue, a court would seem to be justified in declaring a tax
exemption to industry illegal in states that forbid the granting of
76. See Baker and Curry, Taxpayer's Paradise in the Caribbean, I Vand.
L. Rev. 194, 216 (1948).
77. See Newcomer, The Growth of Property Tax Exemptions, 6 Nat'l
Tax J. 116, 121 (1953).
78. See 64 American City, Nov., 1949, p. 121.
79. See Newcomer, supra note 77 at 120.
80. See Snell, Tax Exemptions to Encourage Industry, 29 Taxes 383,
385 (1951).
81. Id. at 383.
82. See Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 Texas L. Rev. 50, 60 (1928).
83. 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 44.65 (3d ed. 1950).
84. See Baker, supra note 82 at 50.
85. See Baker and Curry, Taxpayer's Paradise in the Caribbean, 1
Vand. L. Rev. 194, 201 (1948) ; Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 158 Miss. 753,
131 So. 282 (1931).
86. See e.g., Crow v. General Cable Corp., 223 Ala. 611, 137 So. 657(1931) ; Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156 S. C. 299, 152 S. E. 865 (1930).
87. See Baker, supra note 82 at 61.
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donations or things of value to a private association.88 However, it
has been held that the expected public benefit derived from the
operation of a new factory was adequate consideration for the ex-
emption. 89 This reasoning seems to be inconsistent with the attitude
of the courts concerning the location of an industry as a public
benefit when a direct payment is involved.
Another ground for attacking the validity of industrial tax ex-
emptions laws in the past was a provision in many state constitutions
requiring equal and uniform taxation.90 The provision was con-
stiued as not demanding absolute equality since this is impractical,
even in tax assessment of similar property in the same classifica-
tion.91 Classifications, which may be made according to the char-
acter or use of the property,912 had to be reasonable and not arbi-
trary.93 The provision, now is not on effective limitation because
many states have abolished the law and the remaining provisions are
now very liberally construed.94
Attacks on the basis of due process or' equal protection have
not been successful due to the failure of the courts to extend them
into the field of tax exemption.95 Although a few states prohibit tax
exemptions by express provisions in their constitutions,"" industrial
tax exemptions have generally been upheldY7
- Although there have been vigorous complaints in industrial
states protesting that burdensome tax structures are driving out
private industry,"8 taxes are usually not a major factor in deter-
mining the location of a business,99 and studies indicate that tax
exemptions have had little success as a method of enticing industries
to move to their areas. 00 After the exemption expires, tax rates
tend to rise appreciably as the additional community services such as
88. See Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum, 84 N. H. 1, 26-27, 146
At. 511, 524 (1929), where similar reasoning was used but the exemption
was only to a single manufacturer and was held void principally on other
grounds.
89. Crafts v. Ray, 22 R. L 179, 46 At 1043 (1900).
90. See Baker and Curry, Taxpayer's Paradise in the Caribbean, I
Vand. L. Rev. 194, 201 (1948).
91. See 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 12.12 (1955).
92. Tippett v. McGrath, 70 N. J. L. 110, 56 Adt. 134 (1903).
93. 1 Cooley, Taxation § 353, p. 751 (4th ed. 1924).
94. See Newcomer, supra note 77 at 116-117.
95. See Baker and Curry, supra note 90 at 203.
96. Cooley, Taxation § 661 (4th ed. 1924). '
97. See 16 MAcQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 44.75 (3d ed. 1950).
98. See ordner, State Tax Burdens as an Influence in the Location of
Industry, -19 Taxes 537, 544 (1941).
99. See Garwood, Taxes and Industrial Location, 5 Nat'I Tax. J. 365,
369-69; Stimson, The Exemption of Property fron Taxation in the United
States, 18 Afim. L. Rev. 411, 424 (1934).
100. See Newcomer, supra note 77 at 121.
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schools and roads are installed to meet the sudden growth of the
area.1"' Also, exemption laws and tax rates are flexible and some-
times cannot be relied upon because they are so readily subject
to change.
10 2
Although tax exemption has been defended as a needed aid to
infant industries and a generator of additional tax revenues
which will reduce the burden of the remaining taxpayers, 10 it has
been subjected to considerable criticism by writers.104 The pri-
mary objections are first, that it stimulates keen competition be-
tween the states which weakens the economic framework,0 ° and
second, that tax exemptions encourage the location of unstable in-
dustry through the artificial basis of temporary lower costs. These
industries may then fail when the exemption period is over ;00 also,
location influenced by the tax exemption does not occur in the area
of the most economic utilization of capital and labor resources. On
a nationwide level, this would appear to be undesirable since the
waste attributable to improper allocation would be shifted to the
nation's consumers in the form of higher prices. In addition, the
exemption has been attacked as psychologically disturbing to those
who must continue to pay taxes, 07 especially if the exempt industry
is a competitor of the taxpayer. Since an industry may depart or
fail after the expiration of the exemption period and often locates
in an area regardless of the concessions, 08 the detriment suffered
through the loss of tax revenue appears to exceed any long term
benefits from the exemption.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to popular belief, artificial inducements rarely play
a significant role in determining a responsible industry's location.' 00
Rather, studies indicate that the main factors governing manage-
ment's decisions have been: (1) the area's proximity to markets;
(2) its proximity to raw materials; (3) availability and cost of
labor." 0 Although the southern states have perhaps extended the
greatest aid to industry and coincidentally have made the greatest
101. See Baker and Curry, supra note 90 at 224.
102. See Garwood, supra note 99 at 366.
103. See 9 Duke B. A. J. 15, 16 (1941).
104. See Snell, supra note 80 at 383-84.
105. See Baker and Curry, supra note 90 at 223.
106. Ibid.
107. See Snell, mpra note 80 at 384.
108. See Garwood, Are Municipal Subsidies for Industrial Localion
Sound? 68 American City, May, 1953, pp. 110, 111.
109. See Business Week, Sept. 17, 1949, pp. 70, 72.
110. See Garwood, supra note 99 at 365.
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advancement in industrial development, the growth was not neces-
sarily caused by the subsidy programs, but rather, by the natural
economic advantages of the South, such as the growing markets
and increased supplies of raw materials and labor."" It is, therefore,
probable that inducements of this type are only effective when the
economic advantages of two areas are similar.
In addition to the legality and practicality of these inducements,
there is the more important consideration of their social and eco-
nomic desirability. Although defended by segments of industry,21-
these inducements on a municipal level have been broadly con-
demned by prominent finance associations" 3 and labor unions,1 14
among others. On a nationwide basis, municipal inducements could
stimulate competition and incite retaliatory measures to the point
that all advantages obtainable by any area would be nullified. 12
Furthermore, although in many instances an industry brings to a
new area complete economic rehabilitation, little thought is given to
the stream of idle equipment, resources, and manpower left in the
wake of that company's departure.
Because industry is now recognized as such an important cog in
maintaining a smooth running economy, it is doubtful that the
intense struggle for industry between the areas will subside. But
since inducements like advertising, tax exemptions, and financing
plants on the municipal level have been of limited value, alternative
methods like 'the use of industrial development foundations or
chambers of commerce which do not use public funds, and seldom
advocate "give-away" programs, appear to 'be a 'more desirable
form of encouragement
111. National Planning Association, Committee of the South Reports,
New Industry Comes to the South 2 (1949).
112. See Durisch, Attracting Industry to Cities, 42 Natl Mfimic. Rev.
224, 225 (1953).
113. Ibid.
114. See Reader's Digest, March, 1956, p. 27.
115. See Garwood, supra note 108 at 111.
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